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ECONOMISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF THE LIKELY
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EFFECTS OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
William E. Spriggs
James Stanford*
The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") provides
a framework for integrating the economies of Canada, Mexico and the
United States NAFTA goes far beyond simply facilitating the free
flow of goods among the countries. It also regulates government procurement, investment, banking and financial services, intellectual
property rights, and the movement of business persons and professionals. NAFTA does not go as far as the European Community (EC)
in establishing a unified market for consumers. It does, however,
make the integration of production in the three countries easier. The
factor of production that is most mobile within the NAFTA framework is capital. Chapter 11 of the draft agreement lays out the rights
of investors. Chapter 17 of the draft agreement lays out the protection
of intellectual property. There is no equivalent chapter on labor rights.
It has often been stated that the NAFTA would create a free
trade area with slightly more purchasing power than the EC, but in
fact that is because the existing U.S.-Canada free trade area is already
slightly larger than the EC, as measured by combined Gross Domestic
Product ("GDP").2 In fact, Mexico would only add three percent
greater purchasing power to a North American free trade area? But
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Economist, Economic Policy Insitiute, Washington D.C.; B.A., Williams College;

Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison.
** Research Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; M.A., Cambridge
University, U.K.; Ph.D. Candidate, Economies, New School for Social Research.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., _
U.S.T.
__
For an in depth summary and analysis of the proposed North American Free Trade
Agreement see POTENTIAL IMPACr ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIE OF
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT, USITC pub. 2596, Inv. No. 332-337 (Jan.
1993) (addressing "key provisions" and their potential impact); ECONOMY-WIDE MODELING OF
THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FrA WITH MEXICO AND A NAFrA wrrH CANADA AND MEXICO,
USITC pub. 2516, Inv. No. 332-317 (May 1992); ECONOMY-WIDE MODELING OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FTA WITH MEXICO AND A NAFTA WITH CANADA AND MEXICO, USITC pub.
2508, Inv. No. 332-317 (May 1992) (addendum to the origianl report).
2.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INT'L FIN. STAT. Y.B. (1989).

3.

Id
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the small increase in demand for products that the Mexican economy
would bring to the new free trade area belies several important differences between the Canadian, Mexican and American economies. Combining the three economies is unprecedented because of the disparities
among them. For instance, Mexico's accession into a NAFTA is not
the same as the inclusion of the low wage countries of Greece, Portugal, and Spain into the EC." Mexico's economy is relatively smaller
(weighting by the amount of trade among the countries, Mexico's
GDP is 2.85 percent of the U.S. and Canada's, while Greece, Portugal, and Spain's combined economies are 8.25 percent of the higher
wage countries in the EC) but its population-and therefore labor
force-is relatively much larger (Mexico's population is 30.11 percent
of the U.S. and Canada's compared to Greece, Portugal, and Spain's
population that is 19.94 percent of the higher wage countries in the
EC) and relatively much lower paid (Mexico's hourly compensation
for manufacturing production workers in 1987 was 13.51 percent of
the U.S. and Canada's, while Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish workers
made 45.70 percent of the higher wage countries in the EC wages
and benefits).'
Given the unprecedented differences in labor markets that would
be embraced within the North American free trade zone, this article
will survey several of the competing views that economists have
advanced regarding the likely relevance of the NAFTA for labor
market outcomes and policies. The first section summarizes the key
conclusions of economic theory regarding the effect of international
economic integration on labor markets. The second section places the
debate over the NAFTA in the context of recent developments in
continental labor markets. The final section reviews the methodology
and results of several of the quantitative economic models that have
been utilized to simulate the effects of the NAFTA.

4.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STAT. Y.B.

1989 (using

trade data to calculate trade based weights); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, REPORT 803, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HOURLY COMPENSATION COSTS FOR
PRODUCTION WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING (1990).

5. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INT'L FIN. STAT. Y.B. (1989) (using data for
GDP, population and income measured as GDP per capita); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STAT. Y.B. (1989) (using trade data to calculate trade based
weights; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT 803, INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISONS OF HOURLY COMPENSATION COSTS FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING (1990).
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I. ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE EFFECTS OF
REGIONAL FREE TRADE

Not surprisingly, labor representatives in Canada and the U.S.
have generally opposed the proposed free trade agreement with Mexico, fearing that their wage and employment prospects will be undercut by an inflow of lower-cost Mexican products.' Equally
unsurprisingly, most economists believe that this fear is misplaced,
suggesting that a NAFTA should create mutual benefits for all three
signing countries.' This belief is rooted in traditional international
trade theory, and in particular in one version or another of the famous theorem of comparative advantage This theory was first proposed by the classical British economist David Ricardo, and is now
taught by rote to every economics student early in undergraduate
college: free trade will benefit all countries, even those in which
production costs are high, because it will force all countries to specialize in those products which they can produce relatively less expensively.9 The neat, counter-intuitive nature of this result is very
appealing to economists, who from early in their careers take pleasure
expounding its wisdom to less informed members of the public. As
the prominent economist Paul Krugman writes, "If there were an
Economist's Creed, it would surely contain the affirmations 'I understand the Principle of Comparative Advantage' and 'I advocate Free
Trade."'' 0 And as Krugman writes elsewhere, economists see it as
their duty to "vaccinate the minds" of a public which might otherwise
be misled into believing that international economic openness has

6.

See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-

TIONS, THE POCKETBOOK ISSUES: AFL-CIO POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 1992 25-26
(1992); JEFF FAUX & RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POL'Y INsT., FAST TRACK, FAST SHUFFLE:

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED TRADE AGREEMENT

WITH MEXICO 519 ECON. POL'Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER (1991); CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS, FREE TRADE BRIEFING BOOKLET No. 7 (1991).
7.

See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE:

ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (INST. FOR INT'L ECON., 1992) [hereinafter HUFBAUER &
SCHOTT]; BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ASSESSING THE IMPACT
(Nora Lustig et al. eds., 1992); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMY-WIDE MODELING
OF THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF A FrA WITH MEXICO AND A NAFTA WITH CANADA

AND MEXICO (1992).

8. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION Ch.
VII (1817).
9. Id. at 135.
10. Paul B. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe?,

1 J.

OF ECON. PERSP. 131 (1987).
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something to do with their economic problems."1
Quantitative economic models based on this principle have been
constructed (and will be reviewed below). 2 Their results generally,
although not always, suggest that workers in the U.S. and Canada
will actually enjoy greater employment and earnings opportunities as
a result of a NAFTA than without. However, much of public opinion
remains unconvinced by this body of economic theory, so that the
political prospects for North American free trade are uncertain, despite
the overwhelming opinion of economists-who, for their part, are
frustrated that the debate still rages, 175 years after Ricardo seemed
to settle it once and for all. 3 Yet if a brighter light is cast on the
assumptions which underlie traditional economic theories, this widespread popular skepticism may seem spmewhat more justified.
International trade theory has tended to identify effects of integration which are mutually beneficial (positive-sum), as opposed to
those which may involve some trade-off of net benefit between interest groups (zero-sum or negative sum) and thus raise potential conflicts of interest. The original comparative advantage model identified
the mutual gain that can arise due to trade-oriented specialization in
production and consequent improvements in productivity.'" More recent trade models have stressed alternate sources of mutual productivity gain, such as economies of scale and the subjective consumer
well-being that results from the increased product variety made possible by international trade.'
It is seldom emphasized, however, that this mutuality of trade
gains depends on several critical theoretical assumptions regarding the
behavior of free markets and the nature of economic equilibrium. For
example, the comparative advantage model of bilateral trade assumes
full employment in both countries, and balanced trade between them.
This ensures that aggregate production in an expensive country (say,

11. Paul B. Krugman, What Do Undergrads Need to Know About Trade, Remarks at the
Meeting of the American Economic Asssociation 2 (Jan. 5, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
12. See infra notes 67-156 and accompanying text.
13. See Alan L. Madian, A Free Trade Area With Mexico: Will U.S. Workers Lose?,
526 ANNALs OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL AND SOC. SCI. 82 (1993); "It is my belief that
rigorous economic analysis would lead proponents of labor to conclude that a NAFTA is in
labor's interest generally . . . ." IL
14. RICARDO supra, note 8; see also WILFRED J. EITnER, MODERN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS (1988).
15. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1990); ELHANAN
HELPMAN & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE: INCREASING
RETURNS, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (1985).
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the U.S.) does not decline as a result of free trade with its absolutely
more competitive neighbor (perhaps Mexico), while simultaneously
preventing Mexico from using its cost advantage to penetrate all U.S.
markets.
In this manner, the full-employment assumption ensures that the
mutual gains resulting from the sectoral reallocation of resources are
realized, without needing to worry about the impact of international
trade on the total level of employment. This approach leads naturally
to the conclusion that the key labor market issues raised by free trade
are transitional in nature, amenable to measures (such as retraining
programs and other forms of adjustment assistance) which ease the
movement of displaced labor into the new exporting industries.
Another assumption critical to the comparative advantage model
is the notion that the distribution of income depends only on the
operation of competitive factor market clearing processes. The impacts
of economic and political institutions, such as trade unions, labor law
regimes, or government fiscal and social welfare policies, are not
considered by the theory. Thus, they are assumed to be irrelevant to
the determination of factor prices (wages, profits, etc.) and hence
production costs. Differentials in production costs are thus assumed to
reflect real productivity advantages, and it is in this sense that the
concentration of production in lower-cost locations should lead to an
overall gain in economic efficiency.
Despite its emphasis on the mutual gains of free trade, traditional
economic theory does predict one win-lose trade off under a free
trade regime: economic integration should promote the equalization of
factor prices between trading partners, since commodity trade flows
will serve as a substitute for direct factor market competition.16 In
each country, one factor (the relatively "abundant" one, held to be
capital in the U.S.) will experience higher earnings after free trade,
while the other (the "scarce" factor, labor in the U.S. case) will experience lower earnings. Note that this predicted conflict of interest
within each country is a politically explosive one in the context of
North American free trade. In the U.S. and Canada, labor is the
"scarce" factor, despite several million unemployed and the fact that
most citizens derive their main income from the sale of labor services.17 Even in traditional free trade theory, then, most Canadians and

16. See Paul A. Samuelson, International Factor-Price Equalization Once Again, 59
ECON. J. 181 (1949).
17. DNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, INT'L LAB. STAT. Y.B. (1991).
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Americans would experience a loss in income as a result of a
NAFTA (even though continental output and productivity would increase). This raises, in theory, at least, another labor market policy
issue, namely the compensation of those members of society whose
economic rewards would decline as a result of free trade. The traditional view suggests that if such compensation were paid, free trade
will be welfare-improving, in the sense that no-one would be worse
off (since the factor price losers have been compensated) and at least
some members of society would be better off." In practice, however,
no such compensation schemes (in which all wage-earners would be
reimbursed for the lower equilibrium wage which accompanies free
trade) have been proposed, nor would they be viable. Thus the labor
market policy focus of traditional theories of free trade has remained
on the short run issues arising from the sectoral reallocation of labor.
More difficult labor market issues are raised, however, if the
assumptions underlying traditional comparative advantage theory are
challenged. For example, a casual glance at the world economy confirms that neither full employment nor balanced trade can in fact be
counted on. Instead, long-run unemployment and persistent trade
imbalances are the norm. 9 Indeed, the two are not unrelated: those
countries which have most successfully generated new jobs and/or
rising wages are precisely those (such as Japan and Germany) which
have generated persistent trade surpluses, thanks to their competitive
performance in world markets? Trade surplus economies tend to
enjoy stronger demand, faster growth, larger wage increases, and
lower interest rates-all of which further stimulates consumption
expenditure, investment, and more growth."'
18. MELvYN B. KRAUSS & HARRY G. JOHNSON, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 174
(1974).
19. See U.S. Dep't of Com., SURV. OF CURRENT BUS., Oct. 1991, at C-45, S-10; U.S.
Dep't of Com., SURv. OF CURRENT BUS., Dec. 1989, at 249 (The U.S. labor market has
shown persistent weakness. From 1970, each business cycle trough has shown higher and
higher unemployment until the trough of the 1990 recession. But, the unemployment rate
increased after the trough of the 1990 recession. And since the 1970 recession, each successive recovery has been followed by higher unemployment rates. The 1990 recession was an
exception, but as just noted, unemployment continued to increase months after the recovery
began); see also Int'l Monetary Fund, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, Feb. 1993, at
513-14 (The U.S. has also experienced a current account deficit every year for the last ten
years; the cumulative sum of these deficits is in excess of $900 billion.)
20. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 236-38, 304-06. (The accumulated current account surpluses of Germany and Japan over the same ten year period referred to for the U.S. exceeds $800 billion.)
21. See Thirlwall, The Balance of Payments Constraint as an Explanation of Internationa! Growth Rate Differences, 128 BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO Q. REV. 45 (1979).
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Real world economic experience also confirms that competitive
factor markets are not the sole determinant of wages and other input
prices.' Rather, important differences in factor rewards and production costs can arise between countries due to differences in socioeconomic institutions (such as collective bargaining systems or safety
and environmental regulations). Thus commodity trade between these
regions may be motivated not by (mutually beneficial) differences in
real relative productivities, but by the (zero-sum) cost advantage afforded to particular countries by institutional structures that reduce the
input costs faced by private producers.
In the imperfect world of real global trade and investment flows,
therefore, free trade can have cumulative, non-equilibrating, zero-sum
or negative-sum effects. If trade imbalances are severe and lasting,
surplus nations gain a boost to demand and employment that comes
at the expense of deficit nations. Similarly, if economies are demandconstrained (as is often the case), the flow of investment expenditure
from one country to another increases employment and output in the
host country, but at the expense of the source economy. Economies
of scale can also benefit one free trade partner at the expense of the
other, if transport costs or other real-world "imperfections" are considered; in this case, production of an increasing-returns product may
become concentrated in one region at the expense of the other. In a
zero-sum, demand-constrained world, nations or regions may attempt
to win a greater share of the aggregate demand pie (in the form of
greater exports and greater investment) through the manipulation of
institutional regimes so as to reduce the private cost of
production-by restricting trade unions, for example, or weakening
regulatory regimes.
In this context, labor market policies need to be concerned with
more than simply facilitating a transitional readjustment that accompanies trade liberalization, as expected by the traditional theory. Instead,
the maintenance of aggregate employment levels becomes an important concern. So does the need to create a "level playing field" in
terms of factor market policies and regulatory regimes, so that cost
differentials between regions reflect real productivity differentials and
not the zero-sum practice of social or environmental "dumping".
Conventional analysis denies that such considerations are relevant to
the debate over North American integration, since the traditional trade

22.
1986).

See HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds.,
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models are driven only by competitive factor market clearing and
mutually beneficial gains in real productivity.' Alternative theories
focus attention on the potentially harmful effects of integration that
are possible when assumptions of full employment and factor market
clearing are relaxed.' Before critically reviewing the results of the
economic models associated with these various schools of thought, we
review recent empirical evidence on international trade and labor markets in North America.' Much of this evidence suggests that aggregate employment prospects in the U.S. may indeed have already been
adversely affected by prior trade liberalization measures in North
America.
I.

CURRENT EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE TRENDS IN
NORTH AMERICA

A.

Economic Reform in Mexico

Before discussing the predictions of economists regarding the
impacts of a NAFTA, it is best to analyze the existing trade, investment and employment relationships among Canada, Mexico and the
United States. In the last five years, Mexico has abandoned decades
of efforts to protect its national industries from foreign competition
and trade, as well as to restrict foreign investment and foreign ownership of productive assets in Mexico.26 In order to realize the potential for more foreign investment in Mexico, it is important to recognize how such investment was restricted by Mexican laws until just a
few years ago.
Table 1 shows the limits placed on foreign direct ownership of
productive resources in Mexico under its 1973 Foreign Investment
Law. These limits were identified by the United States International
Trade Commission in preparation for debating NAFA.' Note that
foreign capital was excluded from several important types of activities, and restricted to minority ownership in all other activities. Mexico also had other restrictions which inhibited foreign investment that

23.

EnIHIER, supra note 14.

24. See infra notes 106-08 and 144-50 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 26-67 and accompanying text.
26. OFFICE OF ECONOMICS, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, REVIEW OF TRADE AND
INVESTmENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY MEXICO AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED
STATES - MEXICAN RELATIONS, Pub. No. 2275, at 5-6 (1990) [hereinafter USITC, PUB. No.

2275].
27. Id at 5-4.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss2/3

8

Spriggs and Stanford: Economists' Assessments of the Likely Employment and Wage Effects
NAFTA: Economists' Assessments

1993]

Table 1
Limits on Foreign Investment in Mexico's 1973
Foreign Investment Law
Activities Reserved Exclusively to the Mexican State
a
9
0
o

*
*
V

•

Extraction of petroleum and natural gas
Production of basic petrochemicals
Exploitation of radioactive minerals and generation of nuclear energy
Certain mining activities
Generation of electricity
Railroads
Telegraphic and radio communications
All other activities that may be determined by specific laws.
Activities Reserved Exclusively to Mexicans

*
*
•
*
*
*

Radio and television
Urban and interurban automotive transportation and federal highways transport
Domestic air and maritime transportation
Exploitation of forestry resources
Gas distribution
All other activities established by specific laws or regulations.
Activities With Specific Restrictions on Foreign Ownership

*

49 Percent
o

*

40 Percent
o
o

*

Production of secondary petrochemicals
Manufacture of automotive parts

34 Percent
o

*

Mining under ordinary concessions

Mining under special concessions for the exploitation of national
mining reserves for such minerals as coal, iron ore, phosphoric rock,
and sulfur

Any other activities for which percentages are Indicated in specific laws.
All Remaining Activities

*

Foreign Investment subject to 49 percent limitation.

Source: United States International Trade Commission, Review of Trade and Investment
LiberalizationMeasures byMexico and Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations, Investigation No. 332-282: Phase I:Recent Trade and Investment Reforms Undertaken by Mexico and Implications for the United States, USITC Publication 2275 (WashIngton, DC: USITC, April 1990): Page 5-4.
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are not shown in Table 1, such as capital controls (limitations on the
right to remove financial capital from the country).'
Beginning in 1984, the Mexican National Foreign Investment
Commission issued new guidelines to encourage foreign direct investment 9 The new policy was initially aimed in particular at increasing
investment in import-substituting industries and aiding Mexico's scientific and technological development." Several new guidelines issued
in 1986 and 1988 sought to further convey a new policy attitude.3
Finally, in May 1989, Mexico streamlined its guidelines and instituted
new policies to expedite foreign investment." A key provision was
the automatic approval of 100 percent foreign ownership in those
areas of the Mexican economy that are not "classified."33 In manufacturing, the only classified areas are: firearms, fireworks and explosives; secondary
petrochemical products; and motor vehicle parts and
34
assembly.
Thus, the notion that U.S. companies have always been free to
invest in Mexico is clearly not the case. The encouragement of U.S.
direct foreign investment is a reversal of long-standing Mexican policy dating to the end of the Porfirio Diaz Administration in 1910.6
The new policy was consolidated with Mexico's entrance into the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") in 1986.6 In
addition to the foreign investment policy change, Mexico's new liberalization policy is also evident in the 1987 U.S.-Mexican Bilateral
Framework Understanding and the 1989 U.S.-Mexican Understanding
Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks.7
Indeed, the recent liberalization of Mexico's trade and investment
regulations already constitutes a major step towards the very type of
deregulated regional economic regime which the NAFTA seeks to
ensure. The result has been an enormous boom in both U.S. investment in Mexico, and in two-way trade between the two nations. Mea888suring U.S. direct foreign investment ("DFI") as the sum of new
capital outflows plus reinvested earnings, annual U.S. DFI in the

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

141
f/
i
Id
Id
Id
Id.
See
See
Id

at 5-8 - 5-9.
at 5-6.
at 5-6.
at 5-7.
at 5-7.
at 5-8.
at 5-6 - 5-10.
id at 5-2.
id at 2-1.
at 2-3 - 2-7.
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manufacturing sector of Mexico increased from $0.8 billion in 1987
to $2.5 billion in 1991.38 This is an increase of 222 percent. Total
trade, the value of imports plus exports, increased from $35.1 billion
to $65.1 billion over the same 1987-1991 period, an increase of 85
percent 3 9 The full impact of this boom in U.S. DF1 in Mexico on
employment and trade flows-an impact which can only be accentuated by a NAFTA-has yet to be felt.
B.

U.S. Multinationals and Job Creation in North America

Table 2
North American Trade, 1989
All Trade and
Trade by U.S. Foreign Affiliates Operating in Mexico and Canada
(In U.S. $billions)
Exports from U.S. Multinationals
Located In

All Exports From
Exports
To
U.S.A.

Canada

U.S.A.

U.S.A.

Mexico

...

87.95

27.16

...

Canada

78.81

...

1.43

38.18

Mexico

24.98

.52

Totals

103.79

88.37

...

28.59

Mexico

Canada
40.14

7.27

......

7.59

45.77

40.14

7.27

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Survey of CurrentBusiness, Vol. 71 (October, 1991): Table

19, page 51 and S-16, S-17 for all U.S. trade; and IMF, Directionof Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1991, page 156 for Canada-Mexico trade statistics. And, author's calculations.

The growth of trade and U.S. DFI in Mexico are not independent events. Table 2 shows the total flows of goods among Canada,
Mexico and the U.S., and the flows of goods among U.S.- owned
affiliates operating in the three countries. 4 Looking at all North
American trade, 42 percent ($93.18/220.75) can be accounted for by

38. U.S. Dep't of Com., SURV. OF CURRENT BUS., Aug. 1990, at 73, 81; U.S. Dep't of
Corn., SURV. OF CURRENT BUs., Aug. 1992, at 131, 134.
39.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STAT. Y.B. 403 (1992).

40.

U.S. Dep't of Corn., SURV. OF CURRENT BUS., Oct. 1991, at 51, Table 19, S-16-17

(reporting U.S. trade); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STAT. Y.B.

(1991), 156 for Canada-Mexico trade statistics. (As well as authors' calculations).
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the movement of goods among U.S. owned affiliates operating in
Canada and Mexico. Now, much of the trade by U.S. multinationals
is in the U.S.-Canada free trade area. Still, of the almost $25 billion
that the U.S. "exports" to Mexico, $7.6 billion are shipments to U.S.
multinationals operating in Mexico-roughly thirty percent of U.S.
"exports." A similar proportion of U.S. imports are from U.S. multinationals operating in Mexico.4 ' This is a smaller figure than is common for U.S. multinationals and their activities in some other countries. But, because of past investment restrictions in Mexico, U.S.
firms in Mexico are highly concentrated in manufacturing and virtually absent in primary products.4" This concentration is important because over half of Mexico's exports are in primary products. 3 So,
within the Mexican context, the involvement of U.S. firms in trade is
already very important. This indicates that a large portion of North
American "trade" is less about the shipment of goods among countries and more about the decisions (by multinational firms) of in
which country to locate their production. Thus, to assess the impact
of the recent changes in investment patterns and trade flows, it is
important to look at the behavior of U.S. multinationals.
Table 3 shows manufacturing employment by U.S. multinational
affiliates in Canada and Mexico compared to domestic U.S. manufacturing employment." This comparison captures all the sources of job
creation and job loss domestically, including national firms (those
with no foreign affiliates), foreign firms (with affiliates in the U.S.),
and the "parents" of U.S. multinationals. Of course, this makes the
absolute level of employment by the multinational affiliates in Canada
and Mexico look small in relation to U.S. domestic employment in

41. Indeed, most of the intra-firm exports are intended for reimportation back into the
U.S., following labor-intensive processing or assembly in Mexico.
42. See USITC, PUB. No. 2275, supra note 26, at 5-4, 5-9.
43. WORLD BANK, 1992 WORLD DEv. REP., Tables 14-15.
44. U.S. Dep't of Com., SURV. OF CURRENT BUS., Aug. 1992, at 77-78, Tables 13.1,
13.2; U.S. Dep't of Com., SURV. OF CURRENT Bus., Oct. 1991, at 52-53, Tables 20.1, 20.2;
U.S. Dep't of Com., SURV. OF CURRENT Bus., June 1990, at 37, Table 6; U.S. Dep't of
Com., SURV. OF CURRENT Bus., June 1989, at 33, Table 7 (showing employment by U.S.
multinationals in Canada and Mexico); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.
BULL., 2370 EMPLOYMENT, HOURS, AND EARNINGS, UNITED STATES, 1909-90, vol. 1, at 61
(Mar. 1991) [hereinafter Hours and Earnings]; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LAB., SUPPLEMENT TO EMPLOYMENT, HOURS, AND EARNINGS, UNITED STATES, 1909-90 vol.
1, at 11 (Supp. July 1991) [hereinafter Supplement to Employment, Hours, and Earnings].
(Numbers for U.S. affiliates' employment in Canada and Mexico is for all manufacturing
workers. Employment in the U.S. is for production workers only. Employment in the U.S.
includes all U.S. firms-including U.S. multinationals, domestic U.S. and foreign direct investors in the U.S. As well as authors' calculations.)
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Table 3
Enployment of MamfacturingProduction Workers in North
America, at U& MutinOtional Affdlates in Mexco and Canada,

and Domestic ManufacturingProduction Workers in the US.,
1986-1990
Numbers of Workers

Annual Change in Number

(In thousands)

of Workers (In thousands)

U.S. MNC
Affiliates
Canada

U.S. MNC
Affiliates

Total
Domestic

Mexico

Total
Domestic
U.S.

Canada

Mexico

...

...

...

6.8

93.0

us.

1986

472.7

370.2

12,877.0

1987

469.7

377.0

12,970.0

3.0

1988

483.0

397.4

13,22L0

13.3

20.4

25L0

1989*

475.6

443.5

13,269.0

7.4

46.1

48.0

1990

452.0

462.5

12,974.0

V1.1

18.5

Percent Change
1986-1989

0.6%

1986-1990

4.4

295.0

Total Change

19.8%

3.0%

24.9

0.8

2.9
20.7

73.3

392.0

92.3

9ZO

* There isa break in employment datafrom 1988 to 1989 causedby the BenchmarkSurvey taken in
1989 thatwas more inclusive thanfor the annualdata usedin 198a In the aggregate,the benchmark
causeda net decline of 463 thousandworkers in all US. affifates-worldvide, and regardlessof inuhstrial sector. This is because therewere more lossesfrom affiliatesleaving the survey, thangainsfrom
affiliatesbeingaddedto the survey. However,there wasa netgain in employment among affiliates
through an increasein afffiliates and an increasein employment in affdiates that operatedin both 1988
and 1989. 7he effect ofthe benchmarkis onlyfortheyear to yearcomparisonfrom 1988 to 1989, and
databefore 1989 with 1989 and later. The net change in worldide US. affiiate employment represents
17.5 percentof the grosschange in worldwide qfihiate employment The effect for individualcountries
may vary. A revision of the data is forthcoming possibly in 1993.
Source: U.S. DepL of Commerce, Survey ofCurrentBusiness, Vol 72 (August1992): Table 13.1 and
Table 13.2 pages 77-78 Vol 71 (October 1991): Table 20.1 and Table 20Z pages52-53; Vol 70 (June
1990): Table 6 page37; Vol 69 (June1989): Table 7,page 33for employment by US. multinationals
in Canadaand Mexico; and US. Dept ofLabor,Bureau ofLaborStai=ts Hour and Eamings UnitedState4 1909-90, Volume 1, Bulletin 2370 (March1991), page 61, Supplement to Eaploymen4 Hours
andEarnings; United States 1909-90 (July1991), page IL Numbersfor U.S affiliates' employment in
Canadaand Mexico isforall manufacmtringworker. Eaployrentin the U& isforproducionworkers
only. Employment in the US. includesall U.finns-including U. muldnationals domestic US. and
foreign direct investors in the U.S. And author's calculations.
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manufacturing. But it is the trends or changes in these levels over the
last few years that are of the greatest interest.
Although the absolute employment levels for Mexico in Table 3
look relatively small, in fact the annual changes in U.S.
multinationals' employment in Mexico are large enough to have a
substantial impact on the U.S. labor market. The number of workers
at multinational affiliates in Mexico rose from 370.2 thousand in
1986 to 462.5 thousand by 1990, an increase of 92.3 thousand or
24.9 percent. The number of U.S. domestic manufacturing production
workers was much larger to start with, about 12.9 million in 1986.
This number increased by 392.0 thousand (3 percent) from 1986 to
1989, and then fell by 295.0 thousand from 1989 to 1990, resulting
in a total increase of 97.0 thousand (0.8 percent) from 1986 to 1990.
Thus, at the margin, the number of jobs created by U.S. multinational
affiliates in Mexico is comparable in magnitude to the number of jobs
created in the entire U.S. domestic manufacturing sector in recent
years. The claim that Mexico is too small to have a signficant effect
on the U.S. manufacturing work force are therefore not credible.
Of course, it is necessary to view these shifts in North American
manufacturing employment in the light of the upswings and downswings of the business cycle. From 1986 to 1989, these shifts took
place during economic expansions in all three countries, and thus
went unnoticed in the aggregate statistics for the three labor markets. In the United States, the unemployment rate fell from 6.9
percent in 1986 to 5.2 percent in 1989.' The unemployment rate in
Canada fell from 9.5 to 7.5 percent during the same period. 4' However, in 1990 the U.S. and Canadian labor markets began to deteriorate.48 The U.S. unemployment rate increased to 5.4 percent and the
Canadian to 8.1 percent.49
Since the U.S. and Canada both went into recessions at that
time, the shifts in manufacturing employment for 1990 should be interpreted carefully. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that U.S.
affiliates' manufacturing jobs in Mexico continued to increase in 1990
while domestic manufacturing jobs in the U.S. fell by nearly 300

45. See generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INT'L FIN. STAT. Y.B. (1989).
46. 49 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (July, 1991) Table 1.4 at 8. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development data are used to standardize the comparisons of unemployment rates.
47. 1d.
48. Id.
49. Id&
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thousand. This pattern raises questions about the cause of the shallow
recovery in U.S. employment since the end of the recession in 1991.
When the U.S. economic recovery began in 1991, manufacturing
firms did not increase their employment or wages to satisfy renewed
domestic demand.-' Is it only domestic macroeconomic factors which
are inhibiting a recovery of the labor market, or are American firms
increasingly taking the opportunity to move some jobs south of the
border - permanently? To the extent that firms can now use plants
located in Mexico, many of the manufacturing jobs lost during the
recession may not be regained in the United States. Those jobs may
now be permanently in Mexico. (Canadians have been asking the
same question about jobs moving to the lower-cost U.S. as a result of
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the subsequent recession;
note the large decline in U.S. affiliates' manufacturing jobs in Canada
in 1989 and 1990 as shown in Table 3.)
It is important to note that the comparison made in Table 3
actually understates the extent to which data on the North American
labor market show shifts away from employment in the U.S. and
Canada. This is because only the actions of U.S. multinational affiliates are considered when looking at Canada and Mexico, while all
firms are included in the U.S. domestic figures. Average monthly employment in all U.S. domestic manufacturing establishments declined
by 2.0 percent from 1989 to 1990, but in foreign-owned U.S. manufacturing plants, average monthly employment grew 10.2 percent.5 '
So, the decline in U.S. domestic manufacturing jobs that appears in
Table 3 would be more severe if only American headquartered firms
were shown. Further, these data do not reflect jobs created by Japanese or European firms in Mexican manufacturing. The data may also
undercount U.S. multinationals' true employment in Mexico. Some
U.S. corporations have "shell" operations in Mexico, which limit the
risk of outright ownership of a Mexican plant by vesting nominal
ownership with Mexican partners. These shell operations are not
included in data on the operations of U.S. affiliates abroad, yet they

50. In May 1991, the trough of the last business cycle, seasonally adujusted U.S. manufacturing employment of production or nonsupervisory workers was 12.424 million. The average hourly earnings of those workers in that industry was $8.07 in constant 1982 dollars. As
recently at October, 1992, the constant dollar wage of those workers had fallen to $7.97, and
their employment level was 12.227 million. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, Dec. 1992 at 67, 110. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, July 1991 at 96, 140.

51. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL 92-663, NEWS, Oct.
20, 1992 at Table 1.
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still result in increased employment by U.S. firms in Mexico."
C.

Perspectives from Two Key Industries

Optimistic predictions of the effects of a NAFTA are usually
based on a trade theory in which total employment is considered to
be constant, so that only the sectoral reallocation of labor matters (as
discussed above). Free trade advocates admit that increased trade with
Mexico will cause some low-wage jobs to leave the U.S., but claim
that this will only free up American workers to enter more highly
paid jobs in other sectors. Yet, about three-quarters of the manufacturing jobs created in Mexico by U.S. firms in the last several years
have been in just two sectors: transportation equipment (especially
automobiles and parts), and electronics. Motor vehicles production is
a highly capital-intensive industry with above-average wages, while
electronics is a "high-tech" industry with close-to-average wages. 3
These two industries would probably be considered important ones for
the U.S. to keep if it is to move in a high-wage direction. But in
fact, the record shows that the U.S. has been steadily losing jobs in
these sectors over the last few years, at the same time as U.S. affiliates have been increasing jobs in these two sectors very rapidly in
Mexico.

52. Sinkin, Manufacturing in Mexico: Prospects for the 1990s, INTERAmmucAN HoLDINGS Co., ET. AL, A PARTNERSHIP FOR GROWTH: INVESnImG & MANuFACTURINo IN MExICO
(1990). This was distributed by the U.S. Department of Commerce at a briefing session for
U.S. business executives in Los Angeles, October 26, 1990.
53. International Monetary Fund, supra note 2. (In 1990 the average hourly wage for
U.S. production and nonsupervisory workers was $10.30 in electrical and electronic equipment
and $14.59 in motor vehicles. These may be compared with averages of $10.02 for the entire
private sector, and $10.83 for all U.S. manufacturing.) Supplement to Employment, Hours, and
Earnings, supra, note 44 (for wage data).
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Table 4
U.S. Multinational Affiliates' Employment and U.S. Domestic
Manufacturing Production Workers in Selected Industries in
Mexico and the U.S.
(Thousands of workers) 1986-1990
Mexican Employment in
Nonbank
U.S. Affiliates in Selected Industries
Electric &
Electronic

Transportstion Equipmeat

U.S. Domestic Employment of Production
Workers
in Selected Industries

Electric &
Electronic

Motor VehiTransportacles &
tion Equip1 Equipment
ment

1986

77.2

71.8

1,184.2*

1,258.6

670.7

1987

83.2

73.3

1,175.2*

1,279.0

673.7

1988

98.6

84.1

1,113.7

1,274.2

668.3

1989

110.6

92.5

1,103.9

1,279.3

664.9

1990

116.5

102.6

1,055.4

1,218.3

I

615.2

Absolute Change

Absolute Change
1986-1989

33.4

20.7

80.3

1986-1990

39.3

30.8

--28.8

5.8

20.7

55.5

40.3
Percent Change

Percent Change
1986-1989

43.3%

28.8%

6.8%

1.6% 1

1986-1990

50.9

42.9

10.9

3.2

1

0.9%
8.3

* For 1986 and 1987 these are the sum of production workers in the 1989 two digit code 36, i.e., SIC
361-369.
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Vol. 72 (August 1992): Table 13.1 and
Table 13.2, pages 77-78; Vol. 71 (October 1991): Table 20.1 and Table 20.2, pages 52-53; Vol. 70 (June
1990): Table 6, page 37; Vol. 69 (June 1989): Table 7, page 33 for employment by U.S. multinationals
in Mexico; and, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hours, and Earnings, United States,
1909-9a, Volume 1, Bulletin 2370 (March 1991) pages 61, 290, 329 and 332, Supplement to Employment, Hours, and Earnings, United States, 1909-90 (July 1991), pages 11, 49, and 58. And, author's
calculations.
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Table 4 shows employment by U.S. multinationals in electrical
and electronic products and in transportation equipment in Mexico
from 1986 to 1991, along with total domestic employment in the
analogous industries.' Motor vehicle and equipment production
workers are shown separately for the U.S. because most of the transportation equipment jobs in Mexico are in that industry, whereas the
transportation equipment category for the U.S. also comprises the
aircraft, ship building, railroad, and aerospace industries.ss Therefore,
the broader transportation equipment category in the U.S. covers
employment trends which are not directly comparable to those in
Mexico.
While total U.S. manufacturing production jobs were increasing
between 1986 and 1989, as shown in Table 3 (above), U.S. domestic
employment in transportation equipment and electrical and electronic
products lagged behind. U.S. employment in the electronics industry
declined by 80.3 thousand workers (6.8 percent) from 1986 to 1989,
prior to the U.S. recession. But, Mexican employment in U.S. finns
in that industry increased by 33.4 thousand (43.3 percent) during that
period. In motor vehicles, U.S. domestic employment declined by 5.8
thousand workers (0.9 percent), while overall employment in transportation equipment (including aircraft, etc.) increased by 20.7 thousand
(1.6 percent) - half as fast as for all manufacturing (3.0 percent).
Mexican employment in U.S. firms in the transportation equipment
industry increased by 20.7 thousand (28.8 percent) during the 19861989 period.
Looking at 1990, U.S. employment in all the sectors shown in
Table 4 fell during the recession. But employment by U.S. multinational affiliates in Mexico in these same industries continued to rise
in 1990. Over the entire period 1986 to 1990, these two sectors were
responsible for 70.1 thousand new jobs at U.S. multinational affiliates
in Mexico, or 75.9 percent of the 92.3 thousand total new manufacturing jobs in all U.S. affiliates over that period. Meanwhile, domestic
employment in those two sectors fell by a total of 184.3 thousand
jobs over the same period - even though total manufacturing jobs
54. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURV. OF CURRENT Bus., (August 1992) Table 13.1 and
Table 13.2 at 77-78; (Oct. 1991) Table 20.1 and Table 20.2 at 52-53; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURV. OF CURRENT BUS. (June 1990) Table 6 at 37; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SURV. OF CURRENT Bus. (June 1989) Table 7 at 33 (showing employment by U.S. multinationals in Mexico); Hours and Earnings,supra note 44 at 61, 290, 329 and 332; and Supplement to Employment, Hours, and Earnings, supra note 44 at 11, 49, and 58.
55. For the grouping of industries see HOURS AND EARNINGS, supra note 44, at Appendix B.
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were still up slightly in 1990 over 1986 (see Table 3, above). Thus,
in the very type of industries which the U.S. should be seeking to
preserve, the number of jobs created in Mexico was quite large relative to the jobs lost in the U.S.
Free trade advocates often argue that the incentives for job shifts
from the U.S. to Mexico are minimal; according to the assumption of
competitive factor markets, the low wages of Mexican workers must
accurately reflect their lower productivity.' This hypothesis yields a
claim that the difference in U.S. and Mexican productivity creates a
comparative advantage for the U.S. in more capital-intensive industries that employ high-skilled workers.' The reality is something
different. While Mexican labor has low productivity on average, it
can be highly productive in sectors where foreign capital has brought
in up-to-date technology and management. In sectors such as domestic
corn production, Mexican productivity is very low. But in sectors
such as electronics and automobiles, Mexican productivity has been
converging on U.S. productivity levels in recent years, while Mexican
wages have remained far lower, restrained in part by an increasingly
restrictive labor relations regime." Thus, Mexico has acquired an
enormous competitive advantage in unit labor costs (wages relative to
productivity).
The productivity and wages (hourly compensation) of Mexican
workers relative to U.S. workers in the electronics and transportation
equipment industries are shown in Table 5. 59 The period covered is
1975 to 1984, which is the latest period for which data on sectoral
productivity are available. Much of the convergence in productivity
between the U.S. and Mexico is related to the share of the Mexican
sector that is made up of U.S. firms. Thus, with the increase in U.S.
investment in Mexico in these sectors since 1984, it is very likely
that there has been even further convergence in productivity levels.

56. National Commission for Employment Policy, The Impact of the North American
Free Trade Agreement on U.S. Regional and Sectoral Labor Markets, THE EMPLOYMENT
EFFECTS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
BACKGROUND STUDIEs (1992) [hereinafter NAT'L COMM.] at Appendix B-15.
57. I
58. See Table 5 infra
59. MAGNUS BLOMSTROM & EDWARD WOLFF, Multinational Corporations and Productivity Convergence in Mexico, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH Working Paper 3141
(1989) Table 8 at 25; OFFICE OF PRODUCTIvrY AND TECHNOLOGY, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers, 40 Manufacturing Industries, 34 Countries, 1975 and 1979-89 (Sep. 1990) (unpublished data) at 86,
95. (Transportation compensation is for motor vehicle equipment. As well as authors' calculations.)
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Productivity is measured in Table 5 as value added per employee
in each industry. The differential in worker compensation cost (wages
plus mandated and negotiated benefits and taxes) in the two industries
is also shown in the table. During the period shown, the relative cost
of employing Mexican to U.S. workers was declining. In electronics,
Table 5
Mexican Labor Productivity and Hourly Labor Compensation,
as Ratios of the U.S. Levels, 1975-1984

Electronic Equipmeant

Transportation
Equipment

1975

1979

1982

1984

Productivity

0.63

0.74

0.66

0.83

Compensation

0.24

0.24

0.20

0.15

Productivity

0.53

0.61

0.59

0.57

Compensation

0.31

0.28

0.20

0.13

Sources: Magnus Blomstrom and Edward N. Wolff, "Multinational Corporations and Productivity Convergence in Mexico," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3141 (Cambridge,
MA. October 1989): Table 8,page 25; U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and Technology, Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers, 40 Manufacturing Industries, 34 Countries, 1975 and 1979-89, Unpublished Data (September 1990): pages 86 and 95. Transportation compensation is for motor vehicle equipment. And, author's calculations.
Note: Productivity is measured by value added per employee.

Mexican workers' wages fell from 24 to 15 percent of U.S. wages in
that industry. In transportation equipment, Mexican workers went
from 31 percent of U.S. wages down to 13 percent. Yet, in transportation equipment, Mexican workers were between 53 and 61 percent
as productive as U.S. workers. In the electronics industry, the difference is even more stark. In electronics, Mexican workers went from
63 to 83 percent as productive as U.S. workers. Thus, the unit labor
costs of production in Mexico in these industries are much lower than
in the United States. It would not be surprising, therefore, to see U.S.
companies seeking to increase employment in Mexico relative to the
U.S. And again, these are not low-wage industries by U.S. standards.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss2/3

20

Spriggs and Stanford: Economists' Assessments of the Likely Employment and Wage Effects
19931

NAFTA: Economists' Assessments

These are "high-tech" (electronics) and capital intensive (transportation
equipment) industries, for which the traditional comparative advantage
model would expect the U.S. to retain a cost advantage.
D.

Current Wage Trends Among North American
Production Workers

One has to take the recent fluctuations in the Mexican and
American business cycles into account in evaluating these employment trends. The Mexican economy was in a recovery throughout the
period covered, while the U.S. economy was in a late expansion
phase from 1986 to 1989 and then entered a recession in 1990. '
Nevertheless, differences in job creation of this magnitude, especially
when highly concentrated in certain specific industries, suggest that
more than ordinary fluctuations of the business cycle were at work.
Alternatively, it could be argued that some of the manufacturing
jobs created by U.S. firms in Mexico in recent years have been in
response to the growth of Mexico's domestic market. But the fact
that three-quarters of these new jobs are in two industries with falling
employment in the U.S. suggests that most of this new employment
created in Mexico by U.S. firms represented a shift away from the
U.S. as a production location.
Most importantly, the shift of jobs at the margin can have a big
influence on the wages and working conditions which American
workers are able to negotiate. This is especially important because of
the current slackness in the U.S. labor market, as well as the inadequacy of U.S. policies for adjustment assistance and labor retraining.
Unemployment is stuck at well over 7 percent, while real wages for
most American workers have been falling for the past few years.6'
Table 6 shows how these shifts have affected U.S. manufacturing
workers in relation to their Canadian and Mexican counterparts.'
As we would expect, the shift in employment at the margin is
leading to some wage convergence between U.S. and Mexican manufacturing production workers. This shift could lead to a convergence

60. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INT'L FiN. STAT. Y.B. (1990).
61. See U.S. Dept. of Corn., SURVEY OF CURRENT BUS., Oct. 1991 at C-45, S-10; U.S.
Dept. of Com., SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Dec. 1989, at 249.
62. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT 825 International

Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing, 1991,
(June, 1992) Table 4 at 8 and Table 6 at 10 (showing wage data and exchange rates); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STAT. (April, 1992) at 150, 370

and 554 (showing inflation adjustment using consumer price index).
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Table 6
Hourly Compensation* of Production Workers
In Manufacturing
Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 1986-1991
Real Compensation In Home Currency (In 1991 Currency)
Canada

Mexico

U.S.A.

Real Compensation In U.S.$
at 1991 Exchange Rates
Canada

Mexco

U.S.A.

1986

19.29

6,221.23

16.46

$16.84

$2.06

$16.46

1987

19.15

5,813.88

16.19

16.71

1.93

16.19

1988

19.32

5,591.26

16.02

16.86

1.85

16.02

1989

19.41

6,071.21

15.73

16.93

2.01

15.73

1990

19.74

6,222.31

15.52

17.23

2.06

15.52

1991

19.84

6,549.00

15.45

17.31

2.17

15.45

Percent
Change
1986-1989

0.6%

2.4%

1986-1991

2.8

5.3

4.4%
6.1

Source: For wage data and exchange rates, U.S. Dept. Of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, InternationalCompasons of Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers
in Manufacturing, 1991, Report 825 (June, 1992) Table 4, page 8 and Table 6, page 10
for Inflation adjustment using consumer price Index InternationalMonetary Fund, International Rnancial Statistics, Volume XLV (April, 1992) Pages 150, 370 and 554. And,
author's calculations.
Hourly compensation Includes all payments made directly to the worker (pay for time
worked-basic time and piece rates plus overtime premiums, shift differentials, other
premiums, and bonuses paid regularly each pay period, and costof-livlng adjustments,
pay for time not worked-vacations, holidays, and other leave, seasonal or Irregular
bonuses and other special payments, selected social allowances, and the cost of payments In kind-before payroll deductions of any kind) and employer expenditures for
legally required Insurance programs and contractual and private benefit plans.

in wages through two paths. First, if the shifts in employment are for
similar positions, the wages of U.S. production workers would be
lowered toward the Mexican wage level through direct labor market
competition. Or, second, if low-wage U.S. jobs are not being created,
but Mexican jobs are created at wages higher than the Mexican average wage, then Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. wages would also converge through a composition effect. The shifts in employment could
even lead to a divergence in wages if Mexican wages do not rise as
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fast through new job creation as U.S. or Canadian average wages rise
as a result of the loss of the lowest-wage U.S. or Canadian workers.
(This may help to explain the increase in Canadian average wages
despite the big loss of employment there.)
Prior to the U.S. and Canadian recession, during the period
1986-1989, convergence between U.S. and Mexican wages was the
result of U.S. wages falling faster than Mexican wages - 4.4 percent
for the U.S. compared to Mexico's 2.4 percent. But, while U.S. manufacturing production wages and employment continued to fall during
the U.S. recession, Mexican production wages and employment rose.
So, over the period 1986-1991, the convergence in wages is almost
equally divided between a rise in Mexican wages (5.3 percent higher)
and a fall in U.S. wages (6.1 percent lower). Mexican and Canadian
wages diverged between 1986 and 1989 because Canadian wages rose
while Mexican wages fell. The effect of the Canadian recession was a
slowing down of the Canadian wage growth. So, for the period 19861991, there is some convergence between Canadian and Mexican
wages because Canadian wages did not rise as fast as Mexico's.
The weakness of the U.S. labor market has affected the wages of
all Americans, even the highly-educated workers who are supposed to
be benefitting from international economic integration.63 From 1987
to 1990, for example, real wages fell for all groups of male workers
with less than two years of post-collegiate education, representing
over 90 percent of American men.' Table 7 shows the wages of
U.S. men, by education, for 1973 and the period 1987-1990.' Clearly, for all education levels except Americans with two years of postcollegiate study, real wages have been falling. Real wages fell by 7.0
percent for those men who did not finish high school, by 5.8 percent
for those who graduated from high school, and by 2.3 percent for
those who finished four years of college.' For that small share (7.8
percent) of the U.S. male work force that has two years of post-collegiate education or more, the real wage increase was only 1.7 percent.
So far, then, the opening of the Mexican market to U.S. goods
and investment has not led to any marked improvement in the U.S.

63. See L. Mishel & J. Bernstein, Declining Wages for High School and College Graduates, 539 ECON. POL'Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER (1992).
64. Id
65. Id The wages reported are weighted by the number of workers, rather than the
number of hours. This is to control for the bias of excluding low-wage workers during economic downturns.
66. Id. at 7-11.
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Table 7
US. Men, An Induatrles, An Occupations, Real Wages
(In Constant $1991, 1973 and 1987-1990)
High School
Drop Out

High School
Graduate

Four Years of
College

College Plus 2
Yeats

1973

$11.48

$13.50

$18.99

$21.09

1987

9.35

11.55

17.55

20.85

1988

9.29

11.43

17.38

20.74

1989

9.01

11.15

17.13

21.05

1990

8.70

10.88

17.14

21.20

Percentage
Change
1987-1990

7.0%

5.8%

2.3%

1.7%

1973-1990

24.2

19.4

9.7

0.5

Source: Lawrence Mishel and Jared Bernstein, 'Declining Wages for High School and
College Graduates: Pay and Benefits Trends by Education, Gender, Occupation, and
State, 1979-1991," Economic Policy Institute (Washington, DC: 1992). And, author's calculations.

labor market, and may even have had the reverse effect.'7 Indeed,
the deterioration in the economic conditions of most Americans over
the past decade is hard to reconcile with the gains that, according to
traditional economic theory, should have resulted from the closer
integration between the U.S. and global economies that occurred over
the same period. The empirical data presented in this section suggest
the existence of certain labor market consequences of international
economic linkages that are assumed not to exist in the traditional free
trade theories-consequences such as unemployment, falling wages,
and a diversion of aggregate investment and output on the basis of
absolute cost differentials. Free trade advocates might argue that this
is because the potential gains from international openness are too
small to offset deeper problems in the U.S. labor market; skeptics
might respond that it is precisely those international linkages (in-

67. Note, however, that Table 8 infra also shows that real wages have been falling for
most men since 1973, indicating that the wage declines are part of a longer trend, and could
not solely be the result of recent changes in North American trade patterns.
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creased investment by U.S. firms abroad, and large and persistent
U.S. trade deficits) that have contributed in part to the worsening of
conditions in the U.S. labor market. In order to help choose among
such alternative explanations of observed economic phenomena, as
well as to help predict the effects of future policy changes, economists have developed theoretical and quantitative simulation models;
we will now review several of these models as they have been applied to the labor market issues raised by North American economic
integration.
III. ECONOMIC MODELS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

Economists have used various models to predict the effects of
the NAFTA. Since every economic model is simply a quantitative
representation of a particular theoretical orientation, each model reflects the theoretical presuppositions that underlie its architect's understanding of how international economic relationships work. Results
from models that are more optimistic about the economic outcome for
the United States are found in publications by the United States International Trade Commission, the National Commission for Employment Policy, and the Institute for International Economics." Most
of these models utilize initial assumptions very similar to the traditional comparative advantage framework that was reviewed in the first
section. Other studies have relaxed some of these traditional assumptions, and suggest that greater caution is needed in understanding the
likely effects of the NAFTA, including those completed by the United
States Congress' Office of Technology Assessment," Edward
Leamer, and Timothy Koechlin, Mehrene Larudee, Samuel Bowles
and Gerald Epstein." This section will summarize the major model-

68.

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. No. 2508, ECONOMY-

WIDE MODELING OF THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF A FI'A WITH MEXICO AND A NAFrA

WITH CANADA AND MEXCO (1992) [hereinafter USITC, PUB. No. 2508].
69. NAT'L COMM., supra note 56.
70.

HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 7.

71. UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, US-MEXICO
TRADE: PuL.uNG TOGETHER OR PULLING APART (1992) [hereinafter OTA].
72. Learner, Wage Effects of a U.S.-Mexican Free Trade Agreement, Working Paper
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 3991 (1992) [hereinafter Leamer].

73. Timothy Koechlin, et al, Effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement on Investment, Employment and Wages in Mexico and the U.S. (Feb. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst)
[hereinafter Koechlin, et aL]
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ing approaches, their results, and their strengths and weaknesses.
A.

Computable General Equilibrium Models

The most common models for simulating the effects of free trade
agreements are computable general equilibrium ("CGE") models.
Policy makers often desire "hard numbers" to guide their deliberations, and one of the strengths of CGE models is their ability to
provide a wealth of disaggregated empirical estimates regarding the
economic effects of a policy change. Yet most policy makers, and
indeed many economists, are not fully aware of the actual techniques
utilized in CGE modeling, or of the differences between CGE modeling and other forms of empirical analysis (most notably, the differences between CGE modeling and econometric techniques). This lack
of information in turn has influenced the manner in which CGE results have been interpreted in policy discussions.
It is worth reviewing, therefore, the key steps followed in a CGE
modeling exercise. First the modeler advances a theoretical model,
whose equations are supposed to accurately reflect the workings of
the real economy.74 Second, a starting-point database is constructed
from national income accounts and other data sources, describing the
initial position (assumed to be an equilibrium position) of the economy.' Then the parameters of the prior theoretical model are "calibrated" to the benchmark database, so that the equilibrium solution to
this model reproduces the benchmark dataset; in this process, certain
parameters (such as elasticities of substitution in commodity and
factor demand equations) are often taken as given on the basis of
outside studies, while other parameters are specified on an ad-hoe
basis, or else are arbitrarily adjusted in order to reproduce the starting
point of the economy.76 Finally, policy variables in the model (such
as tariff rates) are then changed in order to simulate the effects of
free trade on the real economy.'
It is essential that the key features of this process are made
transparent for those who must interpret the output of CGE research.
Note that the theoretical model is specified entirely prior to any con-

74. See KEMAL DERvIs Er AL, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS FOR DEVELOPMENT
POLIcY (1982).
75. I&
76. Id.; see also JAIME DE MELO & DAVID TARR, A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY (Appendix A), (1992).
77. DE MELO AND TAMR, supra note 76, at 2.
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sideration of empirical data. In other words, the structural relationships represented by the model are based on the modeler's beliefs,
and not on any (direct) observation of empirical evidence. It is these
prior structural relationships that crucially determine the qualitative
response of the model to the simulated policy change, not the calibrated parameters which were added to the model subsequently. Note
also that any prior theoretical model can be "calibrated" to fit the
benchmark dataset. There is thus no standard of explanatory power or
predictive accuracy to which CGE models can be held, nor which can
be used to compare CGE models to one another. The validity of each
model hangs entirely on the prior, non-empirical specification of the
structural relationships in the theoretical model. Attaching certain
numbers to that assumed structure in no way makes the results of the
model more or less believable.
This immediately suggests that there are two consequent, inherent
weaknesses of the CGE approach, as far as the relevance of quantitative CGE output is concerned. First, there is no way of empirically
testing whether or not the underlying structure of the CGE model is
indeed a good representation of the real economy; therefore, it is
impossible to evaluate the predictive accuracy of the model with
respect to either the historical experience of the real economy or to a
forecast period in which the policy change being considered would
presumably be implemented. Second, there is no way of objectively
comparing the accuracy or usefulness of different CGE models. Particular CGE models can be considered to be "good", "reasonable", or
"accurate" only insofar as they are consistent with the prior expectations of other modelers.
What, then, should be made of the fact that many CGE models
expect mutual benefits (for all countries in the free trade zone, and
often for all groups within each country) to arise from trade and
investment liberalization in North America? Does this imply that the
weight of empirical evidence falls strongly in favor of a NAFTA? To
the contrary, the output of a CGE model in itself constitutes no new
empirical evidence in favor of or against trade liberalization. The fact
that many CGE models expect a NAFTA to be mutually beneficial
(or at least not harmful to the U.S., and highly beneficial for Mexico
and Canada) merely indicates that most of these models have incorporated underlying theoretical structures-namely the traditional free
trade model that was reviewed in the first section of this
paper-which expect trade liberalization to be mutually beneficial.
When most of the models are constructed on the standard neoclassical
premise that free trade is mutually beneficial, one does not need to
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"run" the models to find out that they expect North American free
trade to be mutually beneficial.
Keeping these cautionary remarks in mind, how are the CGE
models of a NAFTA constructed, and what do they conclude about
the likely impact of North American integration on continental labor
markets? The bulk of the models incorporate the standard neoclassical
assumptions discussed in the first section: competitive factor markets,
full employment (so that output is supply-constrained, not demandconstrained), and balanced trade.78 In the North American context,
most models incorporate additional assumptions that raise further
questions about their real-world accuracy and relevance.79 Most notably these include the assumption that capital is internationally immobile within North America (so that the models make no effort to describe the likely movement of capital from Canada and the U.S. to
Mexico, following a NAFTA), and the assumption that products are
differentiated in the minds of consumers according to their nation of
origin.s
As discussed in the first section, all of these assumptions are
inaccurate relative to real-world trade and investment relationships,
but these latter two additional assumptions are particularly inappropriate for examining the case of North American integration."' It is
precisely in order to attract new foreign investment that the Mexican
government is so committed to the NAFTA process; while not all of
this new investment would come from the U.S. and Canada (or from
foreign firms who would otherwise serve the U.S. and Canadian
markets by investing in the U.S. or Canada), much of it will." By
simply prohibiting investment flows between NAFITA countries, and
thus freezing the stock of capital in each country at present levels,
the models unjustifiably exclude the possibility of investment diversion. Some models even attempt to gain the "best of both worlds" in
their capital mobility assumption, by allowing a capital inflow to
Mexico (with resulting benefits for Mexico and positive spin-off effects for the U.S. and Canada), but preventing a capital outflow (and
its consequent negative effects) from the U.S. or Canada.83
78. The use of these assumptions in models of a NAFTA is catalogued in more detail
in James Stanford, Continental Economic Integration: Modeling the Impact on Labor, 526
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SoC. Sc. (1993).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
82. U.S. firms alone presently account for over two-thirds of foreign direct investment in
Mexico.
83. Such models include: Robinson et. aL, Agricultural Policies And Migration In a
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Even if investment flows were permitted, the assumption of
national product differentiation (known as the "Armington assumption")" greatly restricts the motive for such flows. It treats products
made in different countries as if they were different products, on the
assumption that consumers distinguish between them on the basis of
quality and other characteristics-that is, different varieties are imperfect substitutes for one another.' This methodology was first developed as a simplification to explain aggregate two-way trade flows in
econometric studies.' But its application to the NAFTA situation is
inappropriate. In reality, it is the fir, and not any particular country,
that owns the production rights for particular product varieties. By
assuming that Mexican output-even if produced by a U.S. firm-is
actually a different product from U.S. output, these models greatly
underestimate the shift in aggregate production to Mexico that is
likely to follow a NAFTA. Largely thanks to this methodology, most
CGE models tend to predict very small increases in U.S. imports
from Mexico, despite the large cost advantage of Mexican-based
plants. Yet this approach is clearly unrealistic for evaluating the possibility of investment diversion by multinational firms, which can
manufacture their own differentiated varieties at any production location; as discussed in the second section, a very large share of North
American trade is accounted for by the intra-firm transactions of
multinational firms.
The use of these assumptions biases the CGE models toward
underestimating the potential negative impacts of continental integration on labor markets-in both the transitional microeconomic sense
(since the inter-industry displacement of labor following a NAFTA
will likely be much greater than predicted by the models) and in the
aggregate macroeconomic sense (in that, contrary to the models'
assumptions, total employment may indeed be affected by trade imbalances and the diversion of investment expenditure). In other words,
the predictions of these models should be seen as "best case" from
the standpoint of their impact on labor markets. In this light, what is
startling is that the predicted benefits of the NAFrA for labor mar-

U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Area: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis, USITC, PUB. No.
2508, supra note 67, at 455; Dnisilla Brown, et. aL, A North American Free Trade Agreement: Analytical Issues And A Computational Assessment, 15 WORLD ECON. 11-29 (1992).
84. After Armington, A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production, 16 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 159 (1969).
85. Id
86. Id.
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kets are generally very small, to the point of being imperceptible.
Most of the CGE models expect the NAFTA to have virtually no
impact on U.S. labor markets. With constant returns to scale in production," and under the best-case assumptions described above, none
of the CGE models predicts a long-run increase in U.S. wages of
more than 0.4 percent, in U.S. employment of more than 0.2 percent,
and in U.S. output of more than 0.5 percent; in most cases, the effects are much smaller.u Spread out over the many years of adjustment to free trade that are assumed by the model, none of these
changes would be perceptible. For example, a CGE model constructed
by KPMG Peat Marwick: Policy Economics Group' finds that even
if Mexico receives additional capital (none of which comes from the
U.S.), U.S. real income would increase by 0.04 percent, and the real
wage would increase by 0.03 percent.' Statistically, this is less than
the measurement error of Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") estimates of average hourly earnings; the relative error (the standard
error91 expressed as a percent of the estimate) for the BLS average
hourly earnings survey is close to 0.90 percent.' In practical terms,
in March of 1991 the average hourly earnings of production or
nonsupervisory workers on private nonfarm payrolls was $10.26."' So
a 0.03 percent gain would be equal to an unmeasurable $0.00311 an
hour. If a worker who made $10.26 an hour worked 35 hours a week
(roughly the average weekly hours of production or nonsupervisory
workers on private nonfarm payrolls) for 52 weeks in the year, this
increase would amount to $5.60 over the course of the year. 4 So the
Peat Marwick study, like other CGE models, predicts no measurable

87. The case of increasing returns to scale is discussed infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 78, Table 1.
89. KPMG PEAT MARWICK: POLCY ECONOMICS GROUP, THE EFFECTS OF A FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND MEIDCO (1991).
90. IH at Table 1.
91. An estimate of the change in wages with the standard error of the change are used
to construct interval estimates of the change in wages. Testing whether the change in wages
is in fact zero, approximately 2 out of 3 intervals from one standard error below an estimate
to one standard error above would include zero. Nine out of ten intervals from 1.6 standard
errors below the estimate to 1.6 standard errors above the estimate would include zero. Thus,
if a change is less than 1.6 standard errors it would not be possible to conclude that the
change was statistically different from zero.
92. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS,
TABLE 2-D at 161 (Dec. 1992).
93. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS,
TABLE C-4 at 138 (Apr. 1991).
94. Id at Tables C-4 and C-5, at 138-39.
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gain to the U.S. economy resulting even from a "best case" scenario
of how the Free Trade Agreement might work.'
The CGE models do not even expect the NAFTA to have an
appreciable positive impact on labor markets in Mexico, which would
be expected to benefit from the transfer of production to lower-cost
sites. Even with a massive inflow of capital (all of which is assumed,
recall, to come from outside of North America), no constant-returns
CGE model expects more than a 5 percent increase in Mexican employment to result from a NAFTA; spread over the long required
adjustment period, this is much less than will be required simply to
absorb new labor force entrants in Mexico.' Some CGE scenarios
even predict that average Mexican wages might fall as a result of a
NAFTA, as a consequence of the induced rural-urban migration likely
to result from the liberalization of trade in agricultural products.'
Another striking conclusion of the CGE models is that, contrary
to their own comparative advantage orientation, very little pressure for
the harmonization of factor prices between Mexico and the rest of the
continent is predicted to result from a NAFTA. Recall that a key
conclusion of the traditional trade theory that is built into the CGE
models is the expectation that trade in goods (let alone direct flows
of capital or labor) will serve to equalize factor prices, setting up a
win-lose distributional conflict within each country. Yet somehow this
result is not replicated in the CGE models, which expect little if any
downward pressure on U.S. wages following the agreement. This
result must be attributed to the ad-hoc nature of several of the CGE
modeling assumptions, most notably the Armington assumption. It
would be very surprising, indeed, if-given the large disparity between U.S. and Mexican wages, and the relatively large size of the
Mexican labor force-free trade in commodities, together with investment mobility, did not result in a significant pressure for wage harmonization.
In sum, proponents of free trade agreements cannot argue that
the proposed NAFTA would generate any statistically detectable gains
unless they make some additional extensions to the standard theory of
free trade." One modeling feature that is commonly added to CGE

95. KPMG PEAT MARWICK, supra note 89.
96. NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO: THE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY (1992).
97. See USITC, PUB. No. 2508 supra note 68, at 455 (citing Robinson, Burfisher,
Hinojosa-Ojeda & Thierfelder, Agricultural Policies and Migration In a U.S.-Mexico Free
Trade Area: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis).
98. Hearings on the North American Free Trade Agreement Before the Subcomm. on
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models with precisely this effect is the assumption of increasing returns to scale in the production of traded goods. As discussed in the
first section, increasing returns are an additional potential source of
mutual benefit under free trade, since two-way trade flows could conceivably allow production in both trading partners to take place at
expanded scale and hence greater efficiency.' If increasing returns
are incorporated into the CGE models, the predicted benefits of a
NAFTA for domestic output rise as high as 2 percent for the U.S.
and 15 percent for Mexico (again spread over many years); the potential increase in Mexican wages resulting from a NAFTA is also higher, as much as 10 percent in some models."r
The problem with these increasing-returns models is that different
assumptions about the precise nature of scale economies and competitive market structure yield wildly different model results. For a policy
maker this renders the models very unreliable, without additional
outside information that allows the policy maker to understand which
formulations yield the more realistic outcomes. For instance, a CGE
model developed by Horacio Sobarzo °' produces widely different
conclusions based solely on differences in the assumed level of corporate concentration in various industries in Mexico; the level of
concentration will affect the degree to which increasing returns are
attained after trade liberalization. Depending on how concentrated
Mexican industries are, he predicts that the benefit of a NAFTA for
GDP in 2Mexico could be as low as 1.1 percent, or as high as 15.5
percent.Y1
There can thus be little confidence that these additional increasing returns benefits of continental integration will indeed be realized.
Moreover, the other assumptions of the models (especially the assumed lack of investment mobility and the Armington assumption)
are such that there is even less certainty that the benefits of increasing returns, if realized, will be so agreeably shared among all countries in the NAFTA. As discussed in the first section, the existence of
increasing returns may actually be harmful to certain trading partners

Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1991) (statement of William Spriggs) [hereinafter
-HEARINGsr].
99. See supra note 15.
100. Stanford, supra note 78, at Table 1.
101. Horacio E. Sobarzo, A General Equilibrium Analysis Of The Gains from Trade For
The Mexican Economy Of A North American Free Trade Agreement, in USITC, PUB No.
2508 supra note 68, at 634.
102. Id. at Table 5, at 625.
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if a desire to minimize transportation costs or take advantage of restrictive socio-economic institutions leads to the concentration of
increasing-returns production in other areas in the free trade zone. 3
It is important to note that the mild predicted effects of a
NAFTA on continental labor markets are highly sensitive to modifications in one or more of the best-case assumptions underlying the
CGE models."1 Two studies are particularly noteworthy in this context.'" One report from the Economic Policy Institute"° shows that
a more realistic treatment of international capital flows can dramatically change the expected effects of a NAIFTA: by adjusting a previous CGE model"° to allow for modest U.S.-Mexico capital flows,
U.S. output is found to decline by 0.62 percent after a NAFTA, and
there would be 550,000 fewer high-wage jobs than if there were no
agreement." Another CGE model of the North American auto industry abandons the Armington assumption, and explicitly models the
profit-maximizing choice of location that faces multinational firms."l
This study finds that U.S. and Canadian auto output falls after a
NAFTA, in sharp contrast to other CGE models, which generally
expect large gains in U.S. auto output (thanks largely to their use of
the Armington assumption).,1 These cases show that the results of
standard CGE models are very sensitive to their reliance on the bestcase assumptions."' In light of the small positive effects of a
NAFTA that are expected even when the best-case assumptions are
invoked, this suggests that a NAFTA carries little upside potential and
much downside risk for continental labor markets.
Finally, it is worth concluding this review of CGE models with a
few words about their likely empirical reliability. As discussed earlier,
the CGE methodology is inherently ambiguous with regard to real-

103. See supra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
104. Stanford, supra note 78.
105. These studies are introduced and discussed in the next four footnotes and accompanying text.
106. HEARINGS, supra note 98.
107. The original model was constructed by Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robert McCleery.
As with other models, assumptions regarding migration flows and labor market segmentation
are important to the results reported by Spriggs.
108. The model's full-employment feature ensures that displaced workers find alternative
employment, but with a consequent fall in wages.
109. See USITC, supra note 68, at 185 (citing Hunter, Markusen & Rutherford, Trade
Liberalization In A Multinational-Dominated Industry, A Theoretical and applied General
Equilibrium Analysis).
110. Id at Table 4.
111. Stanford, supra note 78.
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world accuracy, by virtue of their prior specification of untested theoretical relationships, and the deterministic calibration of the models to
a single starting point of benchmark data." Wherever possible,
however, it is important to check the historical performance of CGE
models to see if they can really be expected to reliably guide policy
makers as to the likely impacts of policy changes. One case in which
such a test is highly informative is the various CGE predictions regarding the likely effects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,
implemented in 19892"3 CGE and other models had predicted that it
(like the NAFTA) would have a mutually beneficial impact on labor
market outcomes in both countries, despite the gap in wages that
existed between Canada and the U.S."' As was shown in Table 6,
the wages of Canadian workers are higher than those of Americans."' And, as was shown in Table 3, U.S. multinationals appear
to have shifted more of their employment out of Canada than the
United States."6 So the experience of Canada since the implementation of the FTA is instructive as to the likely effects of regional free
trade on a higher-wage country.
Comparing CGE predictions to Canada's actual experience during
the first years of the FTA is an uncertain exercise, because the longrun effects of the FTA have not yet been fully felt, and are difficult
to distinguish from the effects of ongoing economic growth or the
recent recession. Nevertheless, given the important role played by
economic models in the free trade debates in both Canada and the
U.S., the wide divergence between predicted and initial actual results
is stark and should be noted, particularly in reference to Canada's
manufacturing sector."7 This is where models expected that the benefits of economies of scale and enhanced market outlets in the U.S.
8
would be felt most strongly."
But in fact, Canadian manufacturing has experienced a bitter

112. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
113. U.S. GENERAL ACcouNTING OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S.-CANADA FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT, GAO REP. GGD-93-21 (1992).
114. Drusilla Brown & Robert Stern, CGE Estimates of the Gains From U.S.-Canadlan
Trade Liberalization, in ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS (Davis
Greenaway et al. eds., 1989); David Cox & Richard 0. Harris, A Quantitative Assessment of
the Economic Impact on Canada of Sectoral Free Trade With the U.S., 19 CANADIAN 3. OF
ECON. 377 (1986); Randall Wigle, General Equilibrium Evaluation of Canada-U.S. Trade Liberalization in a Global Context, 21 CANADIAN 3. OF ECON. 539 (1988).
115. See supra Table 6.
116. See supra Table 3.
117. Stanford, supra note 78, at 104.
118. See models discussed supra note 114.
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contraction since the FTA, with employment falling by 15 percent (in
contrast to CGE predictions of increased employment of 20 percent
or more), and output contracting by 11 percent despite access to U.S.
markets. 19 Poor performance in manufacturing has no doubt contributed to the sharp post-FTA deterioration in Canada's current account
balance, which (contrary to CGE assumptions of balanced trade) has
declined since 1988 by the equivalent of 1.7 percent of GDP."
FTA advocates insist that the decline in Canadian manufacturing is
due to the recession, not to free trade.' This is not convincing, given that the contraction in manufacturing has been more severe in
Canada than in the U.S., despite a similar recession south of the
border, and more severe than previous Canadian recessions." A
rash of manufacturing plant shut-downs (many motivated by lower
wages and taxes in low-cost U.S. regions) accounts for about twothirds of all manufacturing job losses, suggesting that this is a permanent rather than a cyclical result."2
The weakness of previous CGE predictions regarding the impact
of North American free trade can be explored in more detail. For
example, one prominent group of CGE modelers studying the impact
of a NAFTA are Robert Stem, Alan Deardorff and Drusilla
Brown."i Their NAFTA model builds on earlier work by Brown
and Stem to analyze the U.S.-Canada FTA.'" Table 8 shows two
sets of predictions from the Brown-Stem models'26 for the expected
FTA-induced change in employment in goods-producing industries in
Canada, along with the actual changes in employment in that have
been experienced since the FTA. Clearly the magnitude of the actual
changes in Canadian employment do not correspond to the Brown
and Stem projections from either of their models. As discussed, this
is partly due to the recession in the Canadian and U.S. markets. 27
But were the models even able to accurately predict the direction of

119. STATISTICS CANADA, CANADIAN ECONOMIC OBSERVER, July 1992, at Tables 1-19, 120 and 2-3.
120. Id. at Table 1-20.
121. Peter Morton, Trade Deal Cost 60,000 Jobs, FNANNCAL POST, Feb. 19, 1993, at 4.
122. BRUCE CAMPBELL, CANADA UNDER SIEGE: THREE YEARS INTO THE FREE TRADE
ERA (1992).
123. Id
124. Robert M. Stem & Alan V. Deardorff & Drusilla K. Brown, A U.S.-Mexico-Canada
Free Trade Agreement: Sectoral Employment Effects and Regional/Occupational Employment
Realignments in the United States, NAT'L CoM.rv., supra note 56.
125. Id. at Appendix A-6.
126. These models appear in Brown & Stem, supra note 114.
127. See CAMPBELL supra note 122.
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relative employment shifts?
To evaluate the ability of the Brown-Stem model to accurately
forecast employment shifts, Table 8 also shows the Spearman's rank
order correlation between the rank order of the employment shifts of
the industries as predicted by Brown and Stem and as they actually
occurred." This measure shows how the model could pick winners
and losers. If the correlation is positive, it shows that the model
picked the correct order. If the correlation is negative, it shows that
the model's predictions were opposite to observed experience-that is,
the model tended to pick as winners sectors that were actually losers.
The correlation can range between +1 (perfect prediction of the order)
and -1 (perfectly inverse prediction of the order). Table 8 indicates
that the rank order correlations for both the earlier and later formulation of the Brown-Stem model are near zero. 29 Even if we ignore
the changes in aggregate employment that have been experienced in
Canada, therefore, CGE models have been unable even to rank sectors
as to their relative performance.
Based on their poor record of predicting the effects of earlier
integration measures in the North American market, the conclusions
of many current CGE models that a NAFTA will have mildly beneficial labor market outcomes throughout North America must be viewed
with great caution.
B. Other Models of North American Integration
CGE models, while the most popular for purposes of trade policy
simulation, are not the only economic models which have been developed to study the impact of continental integration on the economies
of Canada, the U.S., and Mexico." Several non-CGE models have
also been assembled, utilizing econometric and other methods of
analyzing historical data on trade flows; four will be briefly reviewed
here.' The strength of these models is that they do not rely so centrally on the arbitrary and untestable theoretical assumptions of CGE
models, and they can be evaluated with reference to actual historical

128. Ricardo Grinspun, Are Economic Models Reliable Policy Tools?: Forecasting Canadian Gains from Free Trade (1992) (work in progress, York University (Toronto)). (As well
as authors' calculations of Spearman's rank order correlation.)
129. Id
130. Stanford, supra note 78, at 102-04.
131. See infra notes 133-57 and accompanying text.
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Table 8
Effects of U.& - Canada FTA on Sectoral Employment In Canada
Projected PercentageChanges by Brown and Stern Models

Industry

Actual % Changes
Jan 1989 to July
1991

Brown Stern
1987

Brown Stem
1989

Forestry

3.2

Mines, quarries, oil wells

-0.3

2.2

-1.1

Food, beverages and tobacco

-3.6

0.1

-1.9

Rubber and plastics

-8.6

2.4

-1.2

Leather, except footwear

-31.2

3.9

4.9

Footwear

-36.4

1.8

2.2

Textile

-31.9

-0.4

-35.4

Clothing

-32.6

0.8

-6.4

Wood

-18.5

1.1

-6.1

Furniture

-25.5

2.4

-2.5

Paper and allied

-5.7

0.7

-19.3

Printing publishing

-17.1

-0.9

-3.3

Iron and steel

-21.4

1.2

28.5

Nonferrous metals

2.1

3.1

152.4

Metal fabricating

-25.2

-1.6

-7.1

Machinery (except electrical)

-18.8

2.5

-1.2

Transportation equipment

-15.2

3.3

0.5

Electrical products

-23.4

-0.7

-14.2

Non-metallic mineral

-10.0

0.6

-16.8

Petroleum and coal

16.0

2.5

-11.6

Chemicals

-4.5

-0.8

17.9

Miscellaneous manufacturing

-25.6

1.6

7.3

Construction

13.6

-0.1

1.0

0.00

-0.10

Spearman's Rank Order Correlation

Source: Ricardo Grinspun, 'Are Economic Models Reliable Policy
Tools?
Forecasting Canadian Gains from Free Trade.' Toronto: York
And, author's calculations of
University (work in progress, 1992).
Spearman's rank ordercorrelation.
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data on trade flows, investment, and employment."' Their major
weakness is that they are generally unable to portray the industrylevel and intersectoral changes in productivity, resource allocation,
and market structure that can be important to understanding the effects of trade liberalization.
One complete macroeconometric model of Mexico-U.S. trade
flows has been published by a team led by Clopper Almon.' Unlike the CGE models, this model allows for demand-side effects in
the economy, and the potential stimulative or contractionary effect of
trade imbalances." 34 It finds very small (probably imperceptible)
gains from a NAFTA for output, employment and wages in the U.S.,
by virtue of an improvement in the U.S. trade balance with Mexico.13 But this is a zero-sum effect, the flip side of which is a larger
proportional decline in output and employment in Mexico." More
importantly, by prohibiting (like the CGE models) capital flow from
the U.S. to Mexico, and applying a modified version of the
Armington assumption,'37 the model underestimates the potential
negative impact on aggregate demand in the U.S. If investment diversion is substantial, or if Mexican sales to the U.S. market were modeled more realistically, then the gains in U.S. output and employment
predicted by this model would be converted into losses.
The study by Hufbauer and Schott bases its predictions of the
effects of a NAFTA on the experience of other developing economies
which have unilaterally liberalized their foreign trade and industrial
policies.' It assumes that the impact of Mexico's complete economic liberalization package (of which the NAFTA is just a part) will be
similar to the impact of liberalization measures in 31 other developing
countries.'39 Since economic reforms in those countries generally led
to an increase in their trade deficits, the same is predicted for Mexico; note however that all but one of these case histories involved the

132. RAY C. FAIR, SPECIFICATION, ESTIMATION AND ANALYSIS OF MACROECONOMETRIC
MODELS at 18 (1984).
133. INTERINDUSTRY ECONOMIC RESEARCH FUND, INC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRIAL EFFECTS OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE USA (1990). A
summary of this work can be found in USITC, supra note 68, at 5.
134. Id
135. Id. at VII-A-1 to VII-A-50.
136. Id.
137. In this version of the Armington assumption, Mexican products do not compete
directly with U.S. products, but rather they must win market share by displacing imports
from other countries.
138. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 7.
139. Id
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unilateral liberalization of trade and investment rules, not bilateral free
trade with a more developed economy."4 Thus the trade balance effects of a NAFTA will likely be much better for Mexico (and worse
for the U.S.) than is implied by these other cases. Note also that
much of the presumed benefit for the U.S. of Mexican reforms has
already occurred, and cannot be credited to a NAFTA 1 41 Three-quarters of the resulting net Mexican demand for imports is assumed to
be met by U.S. products, generating a small increase in U.S. employment and wages." This also would normally be a zero-sum effect,
since the trade imbalance's addition to demand in one country is also
a deduction from demand in the other, but in this case the modelers
conveniently assume that Mexican employment is driven not by demand but by the availability of imported capital goods.1 43 Thus employment also increases in Mexico. Most importantly, this study has
also failed to model the impact of North American investment flows
on U.S. employment and output.
Another model based on the extrapolation of previous trade
liberalization episodes is reported in the paper by Koechlin, et al.' 44
Uniquely among NAFTA models, this paper attempts to predict the
effect on the location of investment expenditure of a NAFTA, based
in part on the experience of Spain and Ireland (relatively low-wage
countries) when they joined the EEC, and in part on an econometric
study of U.S. foreign investment in 23 countries.s On this basis,
the potential shift of investment expenditure from the U.S. to Mexico
is analyzed, with estimates of negative effects on U.S. employment
and wages. " This investment shift, of course, will increase employment and wages in Mexico's export-processing industries. 47 However, the authors also note the possible impact of the liberalization of
agricultural trade policy on the Mexican labor force.' 4 If, as seems
likely, this forces a portion of Mexico's huge small-scale farming
population into urban labor markets, the negative impact of NAFTA
on agricultural employment could outweigh the positive impact on
manufacturing jobs, with an over-all decline in Mexican employment

140. Id
141. LUSTIG, supra note 96.
HUFAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 7.
143. Id
144. Koechlin et aL, supra note 73.
145. Id at 5-7.
146. Id at 10-14.
147. Id
148. Id. at 11.
142.
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and wages.' On this basis, the authors fear that a NAFTA could
have a negative impact on labor markets in both countries."s
Finally, an econometric study of the impact of international linkages on U.S. wages has been conducted by Learner."' The theory of
trade underlying this study is very similar to the traditional assumptions utilized in most of the CGE models.' What is interesting,
however, is that Learner is more "honest" to the traditional theory, in
that he does not impose artificial constraints (most notably the
Armington assumption) which inhibit the flow of low-wage imports to
the U.S.' As a result, he expects that U.S. labor-intensive industries
will be devastated by economic integration with a country like Mexico, with a consequent negative impact on U.S. wages.'" This is
quite consistent with the factor price trade-off that traditional economic theory expects, but most applied models have downplayed through
the selective use of assumptions regarding product differentiation,
returns to scale, and capital immobility. ' Learner estimates that international trade has already reduced the annual incomes of 85 percent of the U.S. workforce (all workers except those, such as managers and scientists, with very high educational attainment) by close to
$500 (in 1982 constant dollars) per year." This loss is as much as
100 times as great as the gains from a NAFTA predicted by the CGE
models, and Learner expects that continued international integration
(including but not limited to the NAFTA) will likely magnify this
effect greatly in the coming decade."
IV.

CONCLUSION

This survey of economic theory and empirical evidence suggests
that a surprising degree of disagreement exists among economists
regarding the effects of a NAFTA on continental labor markets. This
disagreement is surprising in light of the traditional dominance of
conventional comparative advantage economic theory. But when the
stringent assumptions underlying this conventional model are relaxed,

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id at 10-14.
Id.
Learner, supra note 72.
Id
Id.
Id. at 13-17.
Samuelson, supra note 16.
Leamer, supra note 72, at 52.
Id. at 55-56
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economists have found that the impacts of economic integration are
neither so predictable nor so benign for labor markets as was formerly concluded. As shown above, traditional models cannot evaluate
many of the potential risks that are posed by international economic
integration, such as the influence of international trade and investment
flows on the demand constraint facing the economy, or the possibility
that investment expenditure and production may be diverted by differences in the institutional factors which shape the operation of factor
markets in all countries.158 Indeed, the models cannot yet reliably
measure even the more important benefits of free trade, such as those
arising from economies of scale or the procompetitive impact of
international competition on market structure. While these effects have
been shown to be potentially more important than the mutual productivity gain predicted by conventional comparative advantage models,
quantitative models are as yet unable to estimate the potential gains
and losses associated with these effects with enough certainty to guide
policy-makers. In summary, the results of CGE and other models of
the NAFTA suggest that even under best-case assumptions, the potential benefits of continental integration for labor markets in all three
countries are very small-but the downside risks (that become possible when one or more of the key underlying assumptions are relaxed)
are potentially quite large.
All of this suggests that there is likely to be more scope for
policy intervention in labor markets following a NAFTA than is implied by the traditional model of free trade. Recall that labor market
policy in comparative advantage trade theory is geared primarily to
facilitating the reallocation of labor from contracting to expanding
industries; the consequent gain in productivity would be sufficient to
compensate those who are hurt by liberalization." 9 Once the strict
assumptions of the traditional model are relaxed, however, then the
agenda facing labor policy makers becomes potentially much more
ambitious. Issues that may need to be addressed in the aftermath of
free trade include the need to sustain aggregate employment levels
(by managing trade deficits and supporting domestic investment), and
the negotiation of harmonized international standards governing those
institutions and regulations which impact on the determination of
wages and other input costs. Economists must become more adept at

158. See supra notes 68-157 and accompanying text.
159. As discussed above, however, the feasibility of such factor price compensation
schemes is very doubtful.
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incorporating unemployment, factor-market institutions, and other
"imperfections" into their models if they wish to contribute constructively to the sensible and efficient design of such policies.
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